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Law Making in the European Union: On
Globalization and Contract Law in Divergent Legal
Cultures
Jan M Smits*
I. INTRODUCTION
One of the most salient problems of law making in a global
world is how to deal with diverging national legal cultures. Ever
since the emergence of the nation-state, law making has primarily
been a task for the national legislatures and courts. They "make"
law for relatively homogeneous societies that are usually
characterized by a common language and culture. This law can be
enforced by the State. As a result of increasing globalization, this
classic picture is now rapidly changing.' If the law is to retain its
role of regulating society (be it no longer a national, but a global
one), we have to find new ways of making law and enforcing this
law. In doing so, several fundamental questions have to be
answered. One is whether law makers should really aim for one
uniform (private) law-as in the nation-state--or rather allow
diversity of jurisdictions. Another is-even if there is a need to
harmonize the law-whether this uniformity is at all possible in
view of diverging legal cultures.
This article offers an account of how to deal with these
questions. This account is not a general and a theoretical one, but
one that is based on the experience of the European Union ("EU")
in the field of contract law. European contract law is thus used as
paradigmatic of globalization and private law as a whole. There is
every reason to do so: the European Union has wide experience
with making law for diverging jurisdictions. In addition to this,
contract law can be considered one of the most important vehicles
for globalization as it facilitates economic transactions. Therefore,
the European debate about contract law may be viewed as a
microcosm of global developments.
The next section is devoted to an overview of the present
situation in European contract law. Parts III and IV address two
main questions in the debate about harmonization of contract law:
Copyright 2007, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
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whether there is a real need for harmonization and whether
harmonization is at all possible. Part V tries to identify the most
effective way of dealing with diverse jurisdictions within the
European Union and suggests that use of an optional code may be
the most viable option. Finally, Part VI offers some more general
thoughts about globalization and private law.
II. CONTRACT LAW IN THE EUROPEAN UNION AND FOR THE
EUROPEAN UNION
Contract law in Europe is characterized by its diversity.
Within the European Union, there are at least four different types
of contract law regimes.2 First, every Member State has its own
national contract law, which implies that there are now twenty-
seven such jurisdictions within the European Union. In addition to
these national regimes, there is a set of rules on contract law of
European origin. This set consists of a rapidly increasing amount
of directives issued by the European Union. Third, there is the
international regime created by the Convention on the International
Sale of Goods ("CISG"). Even though this regime is not
specifically European, it does play an important role within the
European Union. Finally, there are-within several countries-
regional variations of the national model or even (like in the
United Kingdom) several fully-fledged legal systems in
coexistence. These four types of regimes are explored below.
A. Contract Law in the European Union: National Jurisdictions
The twenty-seven Member States of the European Union all
have their own contract law regime. This implies that each
national legislator is competent to draft contract law rules and that
each country has its own national courts to deal with contract
cases. There is at present no highest European authority to provide
binding contract law rules outside of the (rather limited)
competence of the European Union. This implies that, of all the
political, economic, and monetary unions in the world,3 the
European Union is the most diverse as to the law. Although in the
United States, contract law is not a matter for the federal
2. See Jan M. Smits, Diversity of Contract Law and the European Internal
Market, in THE NEED FOR A EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW: EMPIRICAL AND LEGAL
PERSPECTIVES 153-86 (Jan M. Smits ed., 2005).
3. The most important economic union outside of Europe is the North
American Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA"), formed between the United
States, Canada, and Mexico.
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government, one cannot say that American contract law is diverse.
In fact, the regimes on sale of goods and commercial transactions
are very comparable, not only because of the example set by the
Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC"), now adopted in almost all
4American states, but also because of the presence of one
American legal education, one language, and all those other
elements that make a legal culture. 5
It is possible to distinguish several groups of private law
jurisdictions within the European Union on the basis of their
common history, their sources of law, and their predominant mode
of legal thought. 6 The first group consists of the common law
systems of England and Ireland with their emphasis on judge-made
law and the central authority of the English House of Lords and the
Irish Supreme Court respectively. The common law system of
Cyprus (Cyprus was a British colony until 1960) also belongs to
this group. The second group consists of the traditional civil law
countries, characterized not only by a central role for a national
civil code, 7 but also by a highest court whose decisions are in
practice often just as important as the code provisions. Among
these countries, one can distinguish between those that have a code
that is to a greater or lesser extent based on the Code Napoleon
(France, Belgium, Luxemburg, Spain, Portugal, Italy, and Malta)
and those that have a code based on the German model (Germany,
Austria, 8 Greece, and the Netherlands). A third group consists of
the Scandinavian Member States (Denmark, Sweden, and Finland).
They are not only characterized by a common legal history but also
by the existence of several common statutes. Among these are a
statute on the sale of movables and a common contract law act.9
Finally, there is the large group of countries that have entered the
European Union in 2004 and 2007 and that often have a new or at
least recently revised civil code (Poland, the Czech Republic,
Slovakia, Hungary, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Slovenia, Romania,
4. On the UCC, for example, see J.J. White & R.S. Summers, UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE (2000).
5. On the term "legal culture," see discussion infra Part VI.
6. Cf Konrad Zweigert & Hein K6tz, AN INTRODUCTION TO
COMPARATIVE LAW 68 (Tony Weir trans., 1998).
7. Cf Reinhard Zimmermann, The Civil Law in European Codes, in THE
CIVILIAN TRADITION AND SCOTS LAW: ABERDEEN QUINCENTENARY ESSAYS 259
(David L. Carey Miller & Reinhard Zimmermann eds., 1997).
8. Austria has a special position as its AGB of 1811 is, like the French
Civil Code, a natural law code.
9. Cf Zweigert & Kotz, supra note 6, at 280.
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and Bulgaria). The way in which these new or revised codes are
applied and interpreted by the courts of these countries cannot be
compared to the way in which this is done in the traditional civil
law countries. Generally speaking, the mode of interpretation is
much more literal.
Diversity among these twenty-seven contract law regimes does
not mean that it is impossible to draft principles that these legal
systems have in common. A well-known set of such principles is
formed by the Principles of European Contract Law ("PECL"). I"
They do not, however, represent the individual national contract
law regimes. One can only say that they try to provide a common
structure (a common denominator) to Europe's legal systems,
leaving out essential details as to substance and the divergent ways
of dealing with this substance by the courts.' 2 Despite a common
history among most of the legal systems mentioned (most of them
are to a greater or lesser extent based on the Roman law of the ius
commune),13 these systems have developed separately over the last
200 years. To look at this as a mere historical accident, or as
something one could get rid of easily, does not do justice to the
vigor of the differences or to the difficulties in overcoming this
diversity.
B. Contract Law for the European Union: Directives
In addition to the national contract law regimes, the European
Union has until now issued twelve directives in the field of
contract law. 14 This so-called acquis provides several types of
rules that are all based on the internal market provision of the EC
Treaty (Article 95): the justification for European intervention is
that the subjects covered by the directives are of such importance
10. Cf Norbert Reich, Transformation of Contract Law and Civil Justice in
New EU Member Countries, in RIGA GRADUATE SCHOOL OF LAW WORKING
PAPERS 21 (2004).
11. PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW PARTS I AND II (Ole Lando
& Hugh Beale eds., 2000); PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW PART III
(Ole Lando et al. eds., 2003).
12. For a critique of the European principles approach, see Jan M. Smits,
The Future of European Contract Law: On Diversity and the Temptation of
Elegance, in TOWARDS A EUROPEAN IUS COMMUNE IN LEGAL EDUCATION AND
RESEARCH 239 (Michael Faure, Jan Smits & Hildegard Schneider eds., 2002).
13. See, e.g., Reinhard Zimmermann, Roman Law and the Harmonisation of
Private Law in Europe, in TOWARDS A EUROPEAN CIVIL CODE 21 (Arthur
Hartkamp et al. eds., 2004).
14. See EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW (Jan M. Smits et al. eds., 2006);
FUNDAMENTAL TEXTS ON EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW (0. Radley-Gardner et al.
eds., 2003).
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that divergences in national legislation of the Member States
distort the internal market. Thus, the formation of some contracts
is governed by rules on formalities,' 5 representation, 16 the time of
formation, 17 evidence of a declaration, 8 and information to be
provided to the consumer before and after the conclusion of the
contract. 19 The content of the contract is partly determined by
European provisions on interpretation,20 unfair terms,2t and general
conditions. Most European rules, however, refer to performance
of the contract: the European Union provides rules on conformity
in consumer sales,23 remedies of the consumer in the case of non-
performance, commercial guarantees vis-, -vis the consumer,
2 5
time of performance, and the interest due in cases of breach of
contract.2(
The acquis is usually not met with enthusiasm. It was
characterized as being fragmentary, arbitrary, inconsistent, and
ineffective.
27
It is fragmentary because it only covers certain topics, a
"Brussels brick here and there."28  For example, in the field of
contract law, only some specific contracts are covered, and of these
15. See Council Directive 2002/47, art. 3, 2002 O.J. (L 168) 43 (EU);
Council Directive 2000/31, art. 9, § 1, 2000 O.J. (L 178) 1 (EU); Council
Directive 1994/47, art. 4, 1994 O.J. (L 280) 83 (EU); Council Directive
1990/314, art. 4, § 2, 1990 O.J. (L 158) 59 (EC); Council Directive 1987/102,
art. 4, 1987 O.J. (L 42) 48 (EC).
16. See Council Directive 2000/31, art. 9, § 1, 2000 O.J. (L 178) 1 (EU).
17. See id., art. 11.
18. See Council Directive 1999/93, art. 5, 1999 O.J. (L 13) 12 (EU).
19. See Council Directive 2002/65, arts. 3-5, 2002 O.J. (L 271) 16 (EU);
Council Directive 2000/31, arts. 5-6, 10, 2000 O.J. (L 178) 1 (EU); Council
Directive 1997/7, arts. 4-5, 1997 O.J. (L 144) 19 (EU); Council Directive
1994/47, art. 3, 1994 O.J. (L 280) 83 (EU); Council Directive 1990/314, arts. 3-
4, 1990 O.J. (L 158) 59 (EC).
20. See Council Directive 1993/13, art. 5, 1993 O.J. (L 095) 29 (EC).
21. See id.
22. See Council Directive 2000/3 1, art. 10, § 3, 2000 O.J. (L 178) 1 (EU).
23. See Council Directive 1999/44, arts. 2-3, 5, 1999 O.J. (L 171) 12 (EU);
Council Directive 1990/314, art. 5, § 2, 1990 O.J. (L 158) 59 (EU).
24. See Council Directive 2002/65, art. 6, 2002 O.J. (L 271) 16 (EU);
Council Directive 1999/44, art. 3, 1999 O.J. (L 171) 12 (EU); Council Directive
1997/7, art. 6, 1997 O.J. (L 144) 19 (EU); Council Directive 1994/47, art. 5,
1994 O.J. (L 280) 83 (EU); Council Directive 1990/314, arts. 4-5, 1990 O.J. (L
158) 59 (EC); Council Directive 1985/577, art. 5, 1985 O.J. (L 372) 31 (EC).
25. See Council Directive 1999/44, art. 6, 1999 O.J. (L 171) 12 (EU).
26. See Council Directive 2000/35, art. 3, 2000 O.J. (L 200) 35 (EU).
27. See Jan M. Smits, European Private Law: A Plea for a Spontaneous
Legal Order, in EUROPEAN INTEGRATION AND LAW 55 (2006).
28. Olivier Remien, Uber den Stil des Europischen Privatrechts, 60
RABELSZEITSCHRIFT 8 (1996).
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contracts only specific aspects are addressed. This is troublesome
for Continental lawyers as their ideal of a comprehensive and
consistent civil code is being disrupted by law of European origin.
The acquis is also quite arbitrary in the sense that it remains
unclear why some types of contracts are being covered and others
are not. Why is it that package travel and consumer sales are
addressed, but not the regular insurance contract? If the European
legislator believes in harmonization to remedy defects in the
functioning of the common market, much more still needs to be
addressed.
The acquis is also inconsistent because oftentimes periods for
revocation differ without good reason (seven calendar days in the
case of door to door sales, seven working days for distance
contracts, ten calendar days for timeshares, and fourteen calendar
days for distance marketing of financial services).
Finally, the acquis is not very effective. Almost all directives
in the field of private law aim at minimum harmonization, meaning
that Member States can establish more stringent provisions to
protect consumers. The effect of this is that companies are still
being confronted with divergent legislation and may still be
deterred from doing business elsewhere. Thus, minimum
harmonization may not be suited to create the desired level playing
field for European business. It is important to notice this because
minimum harmonization has long been the way the European
Union dealt with law making for diverse jurisdictions: set a
minimum level and allow those countries that want to go above
this level to do so.
These problems led the European Commission to start a debate
about the future of European contract law.29 It is likely that this
debate will lead to a so-called "common frame of reference"
("CFR") in the field of contract law. The most important part of
this CFR will consist of model rules of contract law, drawing on
the present acquis and the "best solutions" found in the Member
States' legal orders. This CFR will serve as a "toolbox" for the
European legislator: where it finds this appropriate, it can make
use of the CFR to draft directives or review the existing acquis.
30
In addition to this, the European Court of Justice ("ECJ") and
national courts could use the CFR as a source of inspiration.
29. Communication on European Contract Law, COM (2001), Nov. 7,
2001; Communication on a More Coherent Contract Law-An Action Plan,
COM (2003), Dec. 2, 2003; Communication on European Contract Law and the
Revision of the Acquis: The Way Forward, COM (2004), Nov. 10, 2004
[hereinafter The Way Forward].
30. The Way Forward, supra note 29, at 3, 14.
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C. The Vienna Convention on the International Sale of Goods
("CISG')
In addition to the national and European systems of contract
law, there is the international regime created by the Convention on
the International Sale of Goods of 1980. Of the twenty-seven
European Member States, twenty-two are party to the CISG. Its
field of application is restricted to the international sale of movable
goods between professional parties. In such a case, the CISG
applies unless the parties have opted out of it. This seems to
suggest that the CISG is an important regime in practice, but there
are several reasons why this suggestion is false.
First, the CISG is often excluded by the parties. This is the
case in many general conditions set by branch organizations, such
as the Federation of Oils, Seeds, and Fats ("FOSFA") and the
Grain and Feed Trade Association ("GAFTA"). A survey 31 among
some large Dutch companies showed that most of them exclude the
applicability of the CISG in their general conditions as well.
Smaller Dutch companies often do not exclude the CISG, unless
legal advice was sought by one of the companies involved. It is
likely that other European countries show similar results. One of
the reasons -for opting out of the CISG is that it contains many
open-ended concepts that still leave room for varying
interpretations. Other reasons seem to be that the content of the
CISG is often unknown to the parties, and they do not find it
worthwhile to put time and money into getting to know this
32
content. There is apparently no need to make use of it as national
legal systems already fulfill the parties' needs.
Second, even if the CISG is applicable, this does not mean that
the whole relationship between the parties is governed by it. On
the contrary: in many respects, national law (applicable in
accordance with the rules of private international law) remains of
importance. This is not only true for certain rules of national
mandatory contract law (see, for example, Article 4 of the CISG on
validity), but also for rules on securities and other topics not
related to contract law as such. This does not enhance the
willingness of parties to make use of the CISG as they need to rely
on some national system anyway.
31. R.I.V.F. Bertrams, ENIGE ASPECTEN VAN HET WEENS KOOPVERDRAG 72
(1995).
32. Id. at 76-77.
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D. Divergence Within One Country
Finally, there is still a different type of diversity. It is the
phenomenon of institutionalized diversity within one country.
This regional diversity can take very different forms. Here, the
focus is on the two most important examples of regional diversity.
The first example is Spain. In Spain, several autonomous
regions have the power to enact their own legislation in some areas
of private law.33 The regional government of Catalonia has taken
the greatest steps in enacting a separate system of law. Since 1975,
Catalonia enacted thirty different statutes in the field of civil law,
building on the Catalan law as it existed before General Franco
abolished the autonomy of Catalonia in 1938. Thus, Catalonia has,
in addition to the Spanish Civil Code of 1888, its own Code of
Succession (1991) and its own Family Code (1998). It is also
envisaged to draft a complete Catalan civil code in the near future.
With respect to contract law, however, the regions' competence to
draft their own rules is debated. Article 149 of the Spanish
Constitution grants the State competence to draft rules relating to
"the bases of contractual obligations." The rather broad
interpretation of this provision by the Spanish Constitutional Court
(indeed leaving only limited competence for the regions in the field
of contract law) is criticized in legal doctrine. 34
The second example of regional diversity concerns the United
Kingdom. Here, regional diversity takes a very different form.
While in Spain there are separate regional systems alongside a
general Spanish law, in the United Kingdom there is no uniform
national law. Instead, there are separate coexisting systems. These
three systems are English law (not only applicable in England, but
also in Wales), Scots law, and Northern-Irish law. In the debate on
the harmonization of private law in Europe, it is Scots law in
particular that has attracted a lot of attention. Scots law, as a
mixed legal system, is said to offer an example for the future
development of private law in Europe: 35 if there is to be some
33. See generally F. Badosa Coil, ". . . Quae ad Ius Cathalanicum
Pertinet": The Civil Law of Catalonia, Ius Commune and the Legal Tradition, in
REGIONAL PRIVATE LAWS AND CODIFICATION IN EUROPE 136 (Hector L.
MacQueen et al. eds., 2003).
34. See S. Espiau Espiau, Unification of the European Law of Obligations
and Codification of Catalan Civil Law, in REGIONAL PRIVATE LAWS AND
CODIFICATION IN EUROPE, supra note 33, at 180.
35. Hector L. MacQueen, SCOTS LAW AND THE ROAD TO THE NEW IUS
COMMUNE (2000); THE CONTRIBUTION OF MIXED LEGAL SYSTEMS TO
EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW (Jan M. Smits ed., 2001). For a critical view, see
Robin Evans-Jones, Receptions of Law, Mixed Legal Systems and the Myth of
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uniform system, it will necessarily be a mix of civil law and
common law.
E. Legal Diversity and Globalization
The legal diversity of the European Union is paradigmatic for
the challenge that we face in an age of globalization. In the
European debate about harmonization of contract law, two key
questions have to be answered. The first is whether there is any
real need for harmonization. The second is whether harmonization
of law is at all possible in view of the sometimes widely divergent
national views of how to regulate society. Both questions are also
important at a global level. Without a firm view of the need for
and the feasibility of uniform law, law makers cannot function
properly. In the next two sections, these two questions will be
discussed.
III. THE NEED FOR HARMONIZATION: No CLEAR ANSWER
The European acquis that was discussed in Part II above is
based on Articles 94 and 95 of the EC Treaty. 36 These provisions
refer to the general purpose of establishing a European common
and internal market. The justification for European action thus lies
in the fact that differences in national legislation may distort the
functioning of the European economy. Most directives also have a
goal of protecting consumers. However, the primary motive is not
idealism vis-6-vis the "weak" consumer. Instead, the primary
motive is the avoidance of the distortion of competition. The
reasoning then goes like this: where the national legislation of
Member States in a certain field (like consumer sale) is divergent:
[T]he laws of Member States relating to the terms of
contract between the seller of goods or supplier of services,
on the one hand, and the consumer of them, on the other
hand, show many disparities, with the result that the
national markets for the sale of goods and services to
consumers differ from each other and that distortions of
competition may arise amongst the sellers and suppliers,
the Genius of Scots Private Law, 114 L.Q. REV. 228 (1998), and Jacques Du
Plessis, Comparative Law and the Study of Mixed Legal Systems, in THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW 477 (Mathias Reimann & Reinhard
Zimmermann eds., 2006).
36. Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European
Community, 2002 O.J. (C 325) 33, 64.
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notably when they sell and supply in other Member
States.
37
Thus, what is vital is the creation of similar European
conditions for the seller (or the otherwise professionally acting
party). Protection of the consumer is merely a side-effect.
An important question is whether this type of legal
harmonization really promotes the development of the European
internal market. 38  The question is fundamental because if
harmonization does not promote the internal market, it should not
take place. Practically speaking, the answer is of great importance
because, in its Tobacco judgment of 2000, the European Court of
Justice held that Article 95 of the EC Treaty does not grant a
general power to regulate the internal market.39 The ECJ held:
[A] measure adopted on the basis of Article 100a [now, as
amended, art. 95] of the Treaty must genuinely have as its
object the improvement of the conditions for the
establishment and functioning of the internal market. If a
mere finding of disparities between national rules and of
the abstract risk of obstacles to the exercise of fundamental
freedoms or of distortions of competition liable to result
there from were sufficient to justify the choice of Article
100a [art. 95] as a legal basis, judicial review of
compliance with the proper legal basis might be rendered
nugatory.4°
Instead, there must be actual-or at least probable-obstacles
to the functioning of the internal market if Article 95 is to be used
as a basis for law making. Further, the elimination of these
obstacles must be the purpose of the measure. If these
requirements are not met, the directive lacks a legal basis and can
be set aside by the ECJ.
To many proponents of harmonization of private law, there is
no doubt whatsoever that the existence of more than twenty-seven
different legal systems in Europe is an impediment to the
functioning of the internal market. Their main example is the case
of the businessman from one country who wants to conclude a
contract with a party in another country but is hindered from doing
37. Directive 93/13 on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts, Preamble,
1993 O.J. (L 095) 29.
38. Smits, supra note 27, at 11.
39. Case C-376/98, Germany v. European Parliament & Council, 2000
E.C.R. 1-8419.
40. Id. at 1-8524.
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so because of his deficient knowledge of Dutch law.41  The
European Commission states:
For consumers and small and medium sized enterprises in
particular, not knowing other contract law regimes may be
a disincentive against undertaking cross-border transactions
.... Suppliers of goods and services may even therefore
regard offering their goods and services to consumers in
other countries as economically unviable and refrain from
doing so .... Moreover, disparate national law rules may
lead to higher transaction costs .... These higher transaction
costs may... be a competitive disadvantage, for example in
a situation where a foreign supplier is competing with a
supplier established in the same country as the potential
client.42
Even though this may sound like a plausible form of reasoning,
it is not wholly satisfactory. In itself, the argument of the
proponents of harmonization-that concluding a trans-frontier
contract is more costly than concluding a contract in one's own
country-is correct. It may be true that contracting parties can
usually deal with the diversity of law by choosing the applicable
law of the contract, but this does not prevent national mandatory
law from being applied to the contract. This poses a problem
because national consumer protection laws often contain detailed
rules that deviate from general contract law, obliging a party to
take advice on law that is unfamiliar to it. Three questions need to
be raised: (1) Is this problem faced to the same extent by all
parties; (2) What exactly are the costs related to trans-frontier
contracting; and (3) Are these costs really caused by differences in
law or by other causes?
First, a distinction has to be drawn between different types of
companies. Diversity of law seems to be a problem primarily for
small and medium sized enterprises ("SMEs"). Larger companies
are usually more experienced in international trade and can thus
better exploit their bargaining position. In addition to this, larger
companies will more often engage in bigger transactions and, in
the case of such transactions, it is less burdensome to incur
transaction costs. Because larger-sized parties usually dictate their
own conditions, regardless of whether their contracting partners
41. See, e.g., Ole Lando, Is Codification Needed in Europe?, 1 EUR. REV.
PRIVATE L. 157 (1993).
42. Communication on European Contract Law, 2001 O.J. (C 255) 30-32;
cf Communication on a More Coherent Contract Law---An Action Plan, 2003
O.J. (C 063) 7-9.
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are located in their own country or elsewhere, the costs of trans-
frontier contracting are not greater.43 This is different for small
and medium sized companies. They do not usually make contract
conditions themselves. They rely on default law instead. If they
are uncertain about foreign law, they will refrain from
contracting. 44 For SMEs, the cost of taking legal advice is
therefore often disproportionate in relation to the value of the
transaction. 45 For consumers, a similar argument applies: they will
not readily contract across borders if they do not know about
foreign law. Their bargaining position is even more restricted
because they cannot negotiate about the choice of law of the
foreign seller or about other conditions of the contract.
Second, what exactly are the costs that these firms and
consumers incur? In theory, these are the costs of obtaining
information about what law is applicable, the contents of the
applicable law, and the differences with their own law. If we
assume that parties currently bear these costs when contracting
abroad, then unification of law would indeed reduce these costs.
Ideally, unification should then also extend to fields other than just
private law. Tax law and procedural law seem to be particularly
well fit for unification if one follows this line of reasoning.
Will harmonization of law indeed lead to the elimination or
reduction of these costs? As long as harmonization is through
directives, the answer must be in the negative: after all, directives
still allow for major differences between European legal systems.
But even in a scenario of complete unification-in which national
private law systems are replaced by a truly uniform European
private law-it is doubtful whether the costs of trans-frontier
contracting would be eradicated. It is, after all, not only the law
that forms a barrier. One may refer to the well-known work by
Macaulay and Weintraub46 that shows how commercial parties are
not usually interested at all in the legal design of their relationship
or in the enforcement of contractual remedies. Drafting contracts
43. See C. Ott & H.-B. Schafer, Die Vereinheitlichung des Europdischen
Vertragsrechts: Okonomische Notwendigkeit oder Akademisches Interesse?, in
VEREINHEITLICHUNG UND DIVERSITAT DES EUROPAISCHEN ZIVILRECHTS IN
TRANSNATIONALEN WIRTSCHAFTSRAUMEN 209 (C. Ott & H.-B. Schafer eds.,
2002).
44. Id. at 213.
45. Cf THE NEED FOR A EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW: EMPIRICAL AND
LEGAL PERSPECTIVES (Jan M. Smits ed., 2005); D. Staudenmayer, The
Commission Communication on European Contract Law: What Future for
European Contract Law?, 10 EUR. REV. PRIVATE L. 255 (2002).
46. Stewart Macaulay, Non-contractual Relations in Business: A
Preliminary Study, 28 AM. SOC. REV. 55 (1963).
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is usually regarded as too expensive and laborious and does not
weigh up against the small amount of cases in which a conflict
arises. The importance of contract law should therefore not be
overestimated.
This is confirmed by the reactions to the 2001 Communication
on European Contract Law. The European Commission asked
businesses, practicing lawyers, and consumers if they experienced
difficulties through diversity of law. The prevailing reaction of
businesses 47 was that the internal market may not function in an
optimal way, but this has less to do with differences in private law
and more to do with language barriers, cultural differences,
distances, national habits, and diversity in the fields of tax law and
procedural law.48 De facto barriers are more important than the
law. Also, consumers do not find diverging contract law the most
important problem. It may be that the confidence of consumers in
protection against the seller in the case of trans-frontier contracting
is lower (thirty-one percent) than in the case of buying things in
their own country (fifty-six percent),4 9 but this is-again-
primarily the result of differences in language and distance. 50 In
my view, the question of whether diversity of law is really a barrier
for the internal market can only be answered by extensive
empirical research on the effect of unification on trans-frontier
trade. Such research is scarce. 5 1
All in all, it is difficult to measure the costs of legal diversity:
empirical evidence that transaction costs are considerably less if
private law is unified simply does not exist. The conclusion is that
there is no clear answer to the raised question. One could think of
47. Cf Reactions to the Communication 2001, Addendum to
Communication on a More Coherent Contract Law-An Action Plan, COM
(2003) 68 final, 2003 O.J. (C 63) 6.
48. I still find representative the reaction of Orgalime (organizing 130,000
companies in the engineering industry): "It will of course always to some extent
be easier to trade with companies and persons from your own country. This has,
however, more to do with ease of communication, traditions and other factors,
which are not dependent on contract law." See http://europa.eu.int/comm/
consumers (last visited Mar. 21, 2007).
49. See Europa, DG Health and Consumer Protection, http://ec.europa.eu/
dgs/health-consumer/events/event42 en.html (last visited Apr. 4, 2007).
50. See Explanatory Memorandum to the Proposal for a Directive
Concerning Unfair Business-to-Consumer Commercial Practices in the Internal
Market, COM (2003), June 18, 2003, at 4.
51. But see Stefan Vogenauer & Stephen Weatherill, The European
Community's Competence to Pursue the Harmonisation of Contract Law-An
Empirical Contribution to the Debate, in THE HARMONISATION OF EUROPEAN
CONTRACT LAW 105 (Stefan Vogenauer & Stephen Weatherill eds., 2006).
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other reasons in favor of harmonization, 52 but whether the
economic argument really holds remains unclear.
53
IV. THE FEASIBILITY OF HARMONIZATION: No CLEAR ANSWER
Once it is established that there is sufficient reason for the
unification of private law-a problematic assumption as illustrated
above-another fundamental question is raised: if a European
private law is put into place, will this lead to real convergence?
54
This is denied by some, including the Canadian scholar Pierre
Legrand, who eloquently argues that a European civil code, or any
other attempt to unify European private law, is not feasible because
of cultural differences among the various European countries and
in particular among the civil law and common law traditions. 55
Legrand takes as a starting point that merely drafting uniform
rules does not result in uniform law. To him, law is much more
than just rules: the meaning of a particular rule in a particular
cultural and national context can only be established after studying
that context. And this context, the legal mentalitg, differs from one
country to another. Legrand claims that these differences are
unbridgeable in the case of Continental civil law and English
common law. Epistemologically, the common law reasons
inductively with an emphasis on facts and related case law, while
in the civil law, systematization is of crucial importance. Where
the civilian tries to rationalize judgments and statutes into a logical
system, the Anglo-American lawyer has an aversion to formal
rules and makes a conscious choice for driving out and even
fighting Continental civil law influence. This choice stems from
cultural differences: an English child is already a common law
lawyer in being, long before he ever knows that he wants to be a
lawyer.
Other scholars confirm Legrand's view. Thus, Mahoney
claims that common law systems are less inclined to impose
government restrictions on economic and other liberties.
Historically, this can be explained by pointing to the development
of the common law as a system that protects landowners and
merchants against the Crown, while, for example, French civil law
52. Smits, supra note 27, at 15.
53. Even if the costs of legal diversity are considerable, they have to be
weighed against the costs of creating a uniform law. Also, other arguments
against uniform law have to be assessed. See discussion infra Part V.
54. Cf Jan M. Smits, Convergence of Private Law in Europe: Towards a
New Ius Commune?, in COMPARATIVE LAW: A HANDBOOK (forthcoming 2007).
55. Pierre Legrand, Against a European Civil Code, 60 MOD. L. REv. 44.
(1997).
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developed as an instrument of State power to change existing
property rights. 56  This different ideology is still apparent in
present day civil and common law. To quote Mahoney:
At an ideological or cultural level, the civil law tradition
assumes a larger role for the state, defers more to
bureaucratic decisions, and elevates collective over
individual rights. It casts the judiciary into an explicitly
subordinate role. In the common-law tradition, by contrast,
judicial independence is viewed as essential to the
protection of individual liberty.
57
This view has far-reaching consequences for the convergence
debate. It implies that any attempt at harmonization of civil law
and common law is doomed to failure. However, many European
measures are issued: the Englishman will continue to look at it as a
common lawyer and the Frenchman as a civilian. To the former,
law is an ars judicandi, for the latter a scientia iuris. Moreover, in
Legrand's view, the whole idea of a European codification is
arrogant because it imposes on common lawyers the supposedly
superior worldview of civilian legal doctrine. The truth is,
Legrand claims, that they each offer fundamentally different
accounts of reality. This leads Legrand to conclude that "legal
systems... have not been converging, are not converging and will
not be converging. '
58
Legrand's argument is to be taken seriously. Even though his
view has radical implications and was severely attacked as being,
inter alias9 "pessimistic," "destructive," "anti-European," and
"esoteric, no one will deny that superficial similarities among
legal systems do not reveal anything about underlying. differences
in legal culture. This point is well formulated by Esin Orulcii:
We can predict ... that if, for example, codes were moved
into the common law, they would soon become glossed by
judicial decisions, exceptions would creep in and the
general principles therein would lose their significance
altogether. Again, if the style of decisions in the common
law were inserted into the civilian legal culture, within a
short period of time they would get starting shorter and less
56. Paul G. Mahoney, The Common Law and Economic Growth: Hayek
Might Be Right, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 503, 505 (2001).
57. Id. at 511.
58. Legrand, supra note 55, at 44; Pierre Legrand, European Legal Systems
Are Not Converging, 45 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 52, 61-62 (1996).
59. Legrand himself sums up these, and other, qualifications of his own
work by others. See Pierre Legrand, Antivonbar, 1 J. COMP. L. 13, 37 (2006).
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comprehensible; facts would become blurred; reference to
past decisions would be replaced by reference to statutory
provisions and so on.
60
This is both a very practical and a highly convincing view on
the European convergence process. It makes clear that law and
society are closely interrelated and that texts will always be
interpreted in the legal culture in which they are applied. There
may come a time when this legal culture is entirely European, but
this time has not yet come. In this sense, Legrand is right to say
that European legal systems "have not been converging" and "are
not converging." To hold that they also "will not be converging"
is a more problematic statement because this is unpredictable: legal
culture can change.At the same time, Legrand seems to put too much emphasis on
the differences between the civil law and common law traditions
and between various national cultures. Influenced by the thinking
of Herder and others, he seems to identify legal culture with
national legal culture while there can be many other types of
culture.
61
Again, the conclusion is that we are not certain of the effects of
creating a uniform law for diverging legal cultures. This points to
other than centralist methods towards a common private law for
Europe. If one agrees that imposition of a uniform text will not
lead to uniform law, then the next step is to look for methods that
allow the element of national legal culture to play a role in
deciding whether uniformity is needed or not. Only such soft
methods of convergence allow us to find out when legal culture
stands in the way of unification. After all, the premise is that if
unification is not left to the State or to European institutions but to
the actors that are directly touched by legal unification, they will
decide to what extent they are in need of uniform law. Bottom-up
methods of unification make this possible.
The importance of this bottom-up approach is also apparent in
other areas affected by globalization. If the effects of creating
supposedly uniform law are uncertain, it may be that the existing
law is being ruined without putting anything back that works.
Gunter Teubner coined the term "legal irritants": a rule of
European origin is not so much assimilated into the national legal
order but, instead, disorders the national legal system.
62
60. Esin Ordcd, An Exercise on the Internal Logic of Legal Systems, 7
LEGAL STUD. 310, 317-18 (1987).
61. See discussion infra Part VI.
62. Gunther Teubner, Legal Irritants: Good Faith in British Law or How
Unifying Law Ends up in New Divergences, 61 MOD. L. REV. 11, 12 (1998).
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V. TAKING THESE DOUBTS SERIOUSLY: THE BENEFITS OF AN
OPTIONAL CODE
It was shown above that there are two fundamental doubts
when dealing with contract law in a globalizing society. First, it is
not clear whether there is a true need for a uniform contract law.
Second, there is equal uncertainty about the effect of imposing a
uniform text in diverging legal cultures. These two doubts should
be taken seriously by allowing a bottom-up approach to
harmonization. In making law for a territory where there is
uncertainty about the need for and the possibility of harmonization,
it should be left to the interested parties to decide if they prefer a
uniform law to their national law. The way to put this into practice
in the field of contract law is by making an optional contract code.
Such an optional code would consist of a set of contract law rules
that becomes applicable when the contracting parties opt-in. Both
the European Commission and the European Parliament have
expressed support for introducing such a "28th legal system" for
the European Union. 63 The obvious benefit of making such a code
is that it allows harmonization from the bottom up: once such an
optional code is put into place, one can see whether parties will
choose it or not. In this way, creating an optional system is an
experimental way of establishing the need for uniform law: if legal
culture prohibits the choice of a law other than one's own, it will
show automatically.
This is not the place to elaborate too much on the exact ambit
of such an optional code. 64 Its success will depend on its contents,
legitimacy, and applicability. In this respect, there are many
variations to consider. Thus, the code could contain general rules
for all contracts (after the model of the Principles of European
Contract Law), but could also be limited to commercial or
consumer contracts or even to the contract of sale; it could contain
only default law or also mandatory law; it could contain a high
level of protection for weaker parties, but also be designed to serve
commercial parties of equal bargaining power; it could apply only
to trans-frontier contracts, but also to purely national contracts; it
("Legal irritants cannot be domesticated; they are not transformed from
something alien into something familiar. .. ").
63. The Way Forward, supra note 29; European Parliament Resolution on the
Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the
Council-A More Coherent European Contract Law-An Action Plan 2004 O.J. (C
076E) 95.
64. Smits, supra note 27, at 55-98.
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could deal with contract law alone, but also deal with other fields
of private law; it could be put in a regulation or in a
recommendation; it could be democratically legitimized by
national parliaments, or it could be the work of academics alone. It
is the right combination of these factors that determines whether a
successful competition of the optional code with national
jurisdictions will take place.
By introducing an optional code for the European Union, a
strong argument in favor of legal diversity is given pride of place.
It is the argument that was originally put forward by Charles
Tiebout.65 Tiebout describes the needs of firms and consumers in
terms of differing preferences. If there is diversity of law, it means
that legal systems can compete with each other to satisfy these
preferences: consumers and firms can choose the legal system that,
in their view, protects their interests best, provided they can leave a
jurisdiction that they do not like ("vote with their feet").
Introducing uniform law would reduce this exit opportunity and
lead to fewer preferences being satisfied.66
It is important to see that, in this view, diversity of law is not
seen as a coincidence but as a reflection of diverging preferences.
For example, the role of good faith is different in England than in
Italy because of, perhaps unconscious, diverging views on what is
just. Often this argument is related to Von Savigny, who
emphasized the "Organic link" between the law and the people.
67
But one need not endorse this Historical School perspective to
admit that it is wrong to impose one uniform preference on
everyone: those for whom the law exists should primarily-within
the limits set by mandatory law--decide which rules serve their
interests best.
This competition among legal systems can contribute to
harmonization of law in two different ways. First, if everyone
could go to the jurisdiction he or she prefers, then practically there
is only one law being applied. But it is likely that long before this
exit process is finished, something else will happen. This is the
second way in which regulatory competition contributes to uniform
law: if too many people are likely to leave, national governments
are stimulated to make their jurisdiction more attractive by offering
the same (or even a more attractive) law as the other country. This
65. See generally Charles Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64
J. POL. ECON. 416 (1956).
66. Another argument in favor of legal diversity is that it allows for
experimentation. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting) (states as experimenting laboratories).
67. F.C. Von Savigny, VOM BERUF UNSERER ZEIT FOR GESETZGEBUNG UND
RECHTSWISSENSCHAFT 78 (1814).
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is also one of the main objections 68 to allowing full competition of
legal systems: it may lead to the famous "race to the bottom," a
level of law that is the lowest of all the jurisdictions among which
the competition takes place. Yet, as often as this fear for "social
dumping" is expressed, there is little empirical evidence there to
support it.69  More importantly, full competition among legal
systems does not seem desirable either: it is precisely the purpose
of minimum harmonization to allow the "race" only to take place
within certain restrictions. Sometimes, the law has to be
mandatory if it is to offer protection to weaker parties.
As long as this minimum level is guaranteed, regulatory
competition provides an important method of convergence because
the need for unification is primarily determined by legal practice
itself and is not imposed from above. The question of what form
this competition should take remains unanswered. Two issues
should be taken into account when evaluating this question.
First, it should be clear that competition does not necessarily
imply that citizens or firms really move physically from one
jurisdiction to another. It is also possible for them to choose
another legal system while physically staying in their country of
origin. In the field of business law, the European Court of Justice
has already paved the way for a free movement of companies:7
they can establish the firm in their country of choice while still
doing business in their place of residence. If they find the English
limited company a more suitable means for their company than the
Dutch BV or the German GmbH, then they are free to choose the
former. Within the limits of Article 3 of the Rome Convention,
71
this is also possible in the field of contract law.
Theoretically, one could think of a variant in which not so
much an entire legal system is chosen as the applicable law, but
specific rules are chosen. This "free movement of legal rules"
allows the transfer of rules from one country to another on a
"market of legal culture., 72 There is abundant evidence for such
"legal transplants," leading the legal historian Alan Watson to
68. There are other objections as well. See Smits, supra note 27, at 89-96.
69. See, e.g., Catherine Barnard, Social Dumping and the Race to the
Bottom: Some Lessons for the European Union from Delaware?, 25 EUR. L.
REv. 57 (2000).
70. Case C-212/97, Centros v. Erhvervs-og Selskabsstyrelsen 1999 E.C.R.
1-1459.
71. 1980 Rome Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual
Obligations, 1998 O.J. (C 027) 34 (consolidated version).
72. Cf Ugo Mattei, COMPARATIVE LAW AND ECONOMICS (1997); Jan M.
Smits, A European Private Law as a Mixed Legal System, 5 MAASTRICHT J.
EUR. & COMP. L. 328 (1998).
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conclude that most legal change is the result of borrowing law
from elsewhere. 73 Thus, in the nineteenth century, contract law
rules, such as those on offer and acceptance, were exported from
Germany to the common law world, while in present times, many
Anglo-American institutions like trust, franchising, and lease are
being borrowed by European countries. Of course, it would be
wrong to think that law can travel through time and place without
any fundamental change in meaning, but it is certainly true that
these transplants do contribute to a more uniform law.
Second, competition only works if there is sufficient
information available about other legal systems. Often, this is not
the case: a Dutch party usually does not know the intricacies of
German law or English law, let alone Polish or Czech law. This is
different in the United States, where there is plenty of information
available on the fifty jurisdictions and where all of this information
is in one language. Within the European Union, comparative
lawyers thus have an important role to fulfill in unveiling
information about foreign law. Moreover, by creating an "optional
legal system," this information problem can be partly overcome.
The optional code can be made available in all languages of the
European Union and can be made as transparent as possible.
VI. GLOBALIZATION AND PRIVATE LAW: SOME MORE THOUGHTS
The core of the view expressed above is that in a society where
there is not one uniform legal culture, the people for whom the law
is made have to decide whether they accept it. An optional code
makes this possible in the field of contract law. Can we transplant
this view to the effect of globalization on law generally?
In this author's opinion, it is important to recognize that, as a
result of globalization, culture is no longer necessarily national.74
Traditional definitions of legal culture emphasize that legal culture
is national in nature,75 but this need not be the case. It is useful to
refer to the definition of culture proposed by the well-known Dutch
73. Alan Watson, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS 95-101 (1974).
74. See also Jan M. Smits, Legal Culture as Mental Software, or: How to
Overcome National Legal Culture?, in PRIVATE LAW AND THE MANY CULTURES
OF EUROPE (forthcoming 2007).
75. See generally Lawrence Friedman, The Place of Legal Culture in the
Sociology of Law, in LAW AND SOCIOLOGY: CURRENT LEGAL ISSUES (Michael
Freeman ed., 2006); John Henry Merryman & David S. Clark, COMPARATIVE
LAW: WESTERN EUROPEAN AND LATIN AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEMS CASES AND
MATERIALS 28-29 (1978). Cf David Nelken, Legal Culture, in ELGAR
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW 372, 378-79 (Jan M. Smits ed., 2006).
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sociologist Geert Hofstede.76 He understands culture to be "the
collective programming of the mind which distinguishes the
members of one group or category of people from another."77 This
definition of culture as "mental software" emphasizes that culture
is something that is shared by a group of people that need not be
defined on the basis of nationality. While traditional accounts of
legal culture emphasize the relationship between nation-states and
culture, this definition allows one to recognize that there can be
important subcultures within one country and that these subcultures
may even cross national borders. One can think of professional
cultures (like those of accountants or international corporate
lawyers); cultures based on ethnic origins, religion, language, or
gender; as well as cultures derived from a social class.78 One can,
for example, speak of a European (or even global) business culture
and of a consumer culture. Sometimes the law should take these
subcultures into account, and it may well be that in a time of
globalization, these non-national cultures are far more important
than the monolithic culture of a nation-state.
A similar point was recently taken up by Amartya Sen in his
book, Identity and Violence.79 In this book, Sen discusses the
European practice of multiculturalism in which people are
primarily categorized in terms of inherited traditions: the fact that a
Muslim is born into a certain community provides him with an
identity that he has not chosen but which still to a large extent
decides his fate.8 ° Western multiculturalism often means being
tolerant of other cultures, which in practice means having a full
understanding that homosexuality is condemned in the Muslim
world or understanding that in some cultures women are denied an
education and marriage is arranged for them by their family. To
Sen, this is clearly wrong: people are not destined by their
tradition, and anyone who wants to break out of it should be able to
do so. People have the right to make their own choices 81 and to
choose how they want to live. It is the responsibility of the State to
allow for such freedom.
The point Sen is making on a general level should also interest
those who discuss the role of culture in unifying private law. Sen
76. See generally Geert Hofstede, CULTURES AND ORGANIZATIONS: SOFTWARE
OF THE MIND (2d ed. 1997); Geert Hofstede, CULTURE'S CONSEQUENCES (2d ed.
2001) [hereinafter Hofstede, CULTURE'S CONSEQUENCES].
77. Hofstede, CULTURE'S CONSEQUENCES, supra note 76, at 9.
78. Id. at 10.
79. Amartya Sen, IDENTITY AND VIOLENCE; THE ILLUSION OF DESTINY
(2006).
80. Id. at 150.
81. Amartya Sen, DEVELOPMENT As FREEDOM 5 (1999).
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stresses that people should be able to choose a culture other than
the one in which they grew up. But this does not mean that one
should accept this other culture in all its aspects. The essence of
Sen's view is that culture is not indivisible: everyone belongs to
diverse categories at the same time and has multiple identities.
82
This is also true for the law: it may be that English contract law
suits the interests of commercial parties better 83 than French
contract law, whereas some may prefer Spanish family law to
Dutch family law. But these other jurisdictions are not preferred
because they are English or Spanish, but rather because of their
content: they come closest to the cultural segments that cross
national borders because they are preferred by a group of people
regardless of their nationality or place of residence. As Gunther
Teubner stated: "Globalising processes have created one world-
wide network of legal communications which downgrades the laws
of nation-states to mere regional parts of this network which are in
close communication with each other."
84
In my view, individuals should-at least to some extent-be
allowed to choose the cultural segments (Teubner's "networks")
created by this globalization process. If individuals are allowed to
choose the segments they like best, it will automatically become
clear where unification of law is possible. Or, to be more precise,
the fact that individuals from different countries are willing to
choose a given cross-border cultural segment-such as an optional
contract code-implies that they prefer this segment to their own
national law. This makes this area ripe for unification. Again,
legal convergence takes place where society feels the need for it.
85
This still leaves open the question: what is the exact
relationship between national law and the local or international
cultural segments to which this article seeks to give a larger role?
Clearly, not every cultural segment should be allowed to prevail
over national law. If, for example, Muslim culture (including the
sharia) were recognized as always prevailing over national law,
then there would be a violation of what constitutes a fair society
under European standards. This calls for the formulation of a
(European and national) minimum level of fairness. Once this
82. "[W]e see ourselves as members of a variety of groups-we belong to
all of them. A person's citizenship, residence, geographic origin, gender, class,
politics, profession, employment, food habits, sport interests, taste in music,
social commitments, etc. make us members of a variety of groups." Id. at 4.
83. See Vogenauer & Weatherill, supra note 51, at 105.
84. Teubner, supra note 62, at 16. See also Gunther Teubner, GLOBAL LAW
WITHOUT A STATE (Gunther Teubner ed., 1997).
85. See Martijn W. Hesselink, The Politics of a European Civil Code, 10
EUR. L.J. 675, 678-81 (2004).
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minimum level is established, it is possible to give more leeway to
cross-border segments and subsequent individual choices.
The best method for putting this into operation is to design
optional jurisdictions, also outside the field of contract law.
Contract law is the ideal candidate for designing an optional code,
as most of the contract law rules are only non-mandatory default
rules. But there are no fundamental objections against drafting
optional European codes of, for example, family law and property
law that also contain some mandatory elements, if public policy so
requires. 86 Of course, these optional codes should meet certain
requirements as to their legitimacy and creation.
87
The aim of this article is to show how the European situation of
dealing with diverse jurisdictions may inform the debate about law
making in a global world. Its main finding is that we should not
impose one binding law upon diverging jurisdictions ("legal
cultures") if there is uncertainty about the need for uniformity or
about the effect of binding supranational law on the existing
national legal systems. Instead, a bottom-up approach to
harmonization is preferred. This approach should acknowledge
that legal culture (such as the culture of commercial contracting
parties) does not have to coincide with the nation-state. This
approach calls for the drafting of optional codes for cross-border
cultural segments: it should be left to the parties to decide to what
extent they prefer these codes to their own national law. If the
challenge of globalization for the law is to find new modes of
governance-as is generally recognized-8 8 -optional codes are a
promising method for dealing with private law relationships.
86. See RalfMichaels, Private or International? Two Economic Models for
Private International Law of Torts 26 (Duke Law School Working Paper Series,
Paper No. 18, 2005). On an optional regime of mortgage credit, Green Paper-
Mortgage Credit in the EU, COM (2005), July 19, 2005. See also Green Paper
on Financial Services Policy, COM (2005), May 3, 2005.
87. This cannot be elaborated in the context of this article. See Smits, supra
note 27, at 66-89.
88. See generally Hertz, supra note 1.
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